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Abstract
An extended small open economy model is developed and used to examine the
e®ect of trade on the illicit expropriation of incomes and the provision of legal
services. We derive conditions under which trade liberalization will reduce expro-
priation activities. We also derive su±cient conditions for the gains from trade to
be ampli¯ed or muted relative to the standard model. The signs of these e®ects
depend on factor intensity rankings and factor abundance ratios. Thus the results
show that trade liberalization will be bene¯cial to countries that export labor in-
tensive goods by reducing the incentives for illicit expropriation and reducing the
costs of providing legal services. The model also shows that trade liberalization
can increase expropriation, particularly for countries that import labor intensive
goods and have labor intensive crime problems.
Keywords: Expropriation, Factor Proportions, Gains from Trade, Legal Ser-
vices.
JEL: F1, K42
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There is considerable empirical support for the idea that economic prosperity depends on
institutions to secure property rights. Examples include Engerman and Sokolo® (1997),
Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Dollar
and Kraay (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Levine (2005).1 Never-
theless, as stated by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), we remain far from having
a useful framework for understanding how economic institutions are determined and why
they vary across countries.2
The aim of this paper is to consider how international trade a®ects the security of prop-
erty rights and predatory activities (expropriation) and how these a®ect the gains from
trade. It is recognized that international trade can a®ect the incentives to engage in un-
productive activities and also a®ect the cost of providing institutions to protect property
rights.3 We extend this literature by incorporating expropriation of incomes and law en-
forcement activities into a general equilibrium model. In this model, factor endowments,
technology and world prices determine not only factor returns and output levels, but
also the level of expropriation and the provision of legal services. The model is used to
describe the relationship between trade liberalization, the level of expropriation in the
economy and the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results, for example, is that,
if crime is a labor intensive activity, trade liberalization can increase crime in developed
countries but reduce crime in developing countries.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we brie°y review the related literature
on trade and predation. In Section 3 we describe a simpli¯ed model in which predation
occurs but the level of law enforcement supplied is ¯xed. Preliminary results, presented in
Section 4, derive the necessary restrictions on factor proportions and intensities of factor
1This literature builds upon pioneering studies such as North and Weingast (1989), Engerman (1973).
2Likewise Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2004) and Rodrik (2008) have highlighted
the complexity of de¯ning institutions and understanding interactions between institutional reform and
economic prosperity.
3For example see Holmes and Schmitz Jr (2001) regarding unproductive activities and Clarida and
Findlay (2003) regarding trade and institutions.
2use in expropriation that must hold for falling trade costs to reduce predation. Section
5 introduces the full model with endogenous law enforcement services and presents the
main comparative static results. The gains from trade propositions are presented in
Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
Models of incomplete property rights have been used extensively in the economics of
crime literature that followed Becker (1968), and in the con°ict literature following early
studies by Boulding (1988) and Hirshleifer (1988).4 As noted by Skaperdas and Syropou-
los (2001), however, there are few formal models that attempt to explain the interaction
between international trade and property rights. To this end Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2001) incorporate endogenous con°ict into a Ricardian trade model model to see how
the gains from trade are a®ected by the need for investment military institutions (guns).
Likewise Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) and Anderson and Bandiera (2006) use Ricar-
dian models, with the addition of potential piracy, to demonstrate how institutions may
promote trade.5
We extend this literature by considering how international trade a®ects the protection
of private property in a small open economy. Thus, as opposed to international con°ict
over common resources or piracy, we consider what Acemoglu (2006) describes as "sim-
ple violations of property rights". Examples include the illicit removal of land tenure,
expropriation of assets, a failure to pay wages and various forms of coercion. In what
follows we refer to these all such violations simply as \expropriation". We also extend
the literature by incorporating expropriation into a factor proportions framework. The
generalization to more than one factor is important since, empirically, expropriation is
4Recent examples of the crime and economics literature include Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2004) and
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000). Notable examples of the con°ict literature include Hirshleifer
(2001), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Collier and Hoe²er (2004).
5For example they ¯nd there is an important \safety in numbers" e®ect and relate this to historical
trade patterns and the usefulness of convoys.
3related to di®erences in relative incomes.6
Investigating the causes of expropriation is an important economic issue since expro-
priation imposes signi¯cant economic costs. For instance Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobatn (1999) note the economic costs of governance indicators (including corruption
and perceptions of crime) on income levels.7 Likewise the ILO (2005) stress the wide
prevalence of coercion and forms of servitude, and Collier and Gunning (1999) highlight
the economic costs of armed civil con°ict.8 In addition to these direct costs of expropri-
ation, the cost of maintaining adequate legal services is a signi¯cant economic constraint
in newly developing economies such as India and China.9
The role of international trade in impeding or facilitating expropriation is, however, the
subject of an enduring debate.10 The potential costs of trade liberalization, in terms of
inequality and crime, have been emphasized by Stiglitz (2002) and Wade (2004). Likewise
rising social con°ict has been attributed to trade liberalization episodes in several coun-
tries. For example Keen (2005) discusses the case of Sierra Leone, Deraniyagala (2005)
discusses Nepal, and Brysk and Wise (1997) discuss some examples of rising social con°ict
Latin America countries.
In contrast Collier and Gunning (1999) and Collier and Ho²er (2002) note the bene¯cial
e®ects of openness on crime and civil con°ict in African countries. Other relevant evi-
dence includes the escalation of crime that occurred in Yugoslavia in 1992 following trade
sanctions, and the rise in crime in Columbia following negative terms-of-trade shocks.11
6See for example Soares (2004). The factor proportions approach also helps us relate our results to
the extensive literature on trade and wages. As noted by Krugman (2008) the factor proportions setting
remains the most useful model for thinking about trade and factor incomes issues.
7Bourguignon (1999) shows that crime is especially high in some developing economies. Kaufmann
and Kraay (2002) report that more than 70 percent of ¯rms and public o±cials stated that organized
crime was \highly in°uential" on state a®airs in Peru. Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003) report that
¯rms in developing East Asia view street crime and corruption as the two leading constraints on business.
8For example the ILO (2005) estimate that there are approximately 12.3 million people who are
victims of forced labor.
9This point is made by Basu (2004) with respect to India and by Keefer (2007) with respect to China.
10Linking openness and expropriation dates back at least to The Wealth of Nations. See in particular
Bk 1, Ch. 9 Par. 15 of Smith (1998). Dollar and Kraay (2002) emphasize the positive empirical
link between growth and poverty and Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) examines the evidence
regarding trade liberalization and poverty.
11For a discussion of the e®ects of UN trade sanctions in Yugoslavia see Brooks (2002) and Andreas
4Thus case studies suggest that the e®ects of liberalization di®er across countries. Evi-
dence from the cross-country literature on openness and di®erent forms of expropriation,
such as corruption and civil con°icts, is also ambiguous.12
In the absence of a clear empirical relationship between expropriation and international
trade it is useful to explore potential theoretical links. In particular trade can a®ect
factor incomes which in turns a®ects the opportunity costs of crime. It may have an
impact on the costs of providing of legal institutions. These arguments suggest that
e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation will di®er across countries depending on a
country's factor endowments and the factors used in expropriation. The following model
makes these links explicit.
3 The Model
Consider a small open economy comprising of a unit measure of identical individuals.
The representative individual is endowed with ¹ Lu units of unskilled labor and ¹ Ls units
of skilled labor, the returns (per unit) to which are denoted by wu and ws respectively.
There are two tradable goods, an exportable and an importable denoted by x and m
respectively. Let px and pm respectively denote the world price of the exportable and
importable. Treating exportable good x as the numer¶ aire we normalize px = 1. Choosing
units appropriately for the importable good m we also set pm = 1. We assume that the
import-competing sector is tari® protected and let p ( > 1) denote the tari®-inclusive
price of the importable good faced by domestic consumers.
The representative consumer i maximizes U(xi
c;mi
c), a homethetic utility function in x







tively denote the consumption of x, consumption of m and the income available to i
(2005). Dube and Vargasz (2007) provide evidence that crime was linked to terms of trade shocks in
Columbia.
12For example see Knack and Azfar (2003) on openness and corruption, Bussmann, Schneider and
Wiesehomeier (2005) on trade liberalization and civil con°ict and Hafner-Burton (2005) on the e®ects
of trade on human rights.
5for consumption of x and m. Corresponding to this utility maximization problem let
V (p;yi
d) ´ V i denote the indirect utility function. Homotheticity implies that the indi-
rect utility function is separable in yi
d and p. More speci¯cally,
V
i = v(p) y
i
d; (1)
where v(p) is decreasing in p.
Both x and m are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition
using skilled and unskilled labor. Perfect competition in both these sectors imply that
unit cost equals price:
cx(wu;ws) = 1; (2)
cm(wu;ws) = p; (3)
where cx(wu;ws) and cm(wu;ws) denote the unit cost functions for x and m respectively.










@wu and asg ´
@cl
@ws respectively denote the unskilled and skilled labor
requirements to produce one unit of good g 2 fx;mg.
In what follows we consider how the comparative static results vary depending on whether
the export good, x, is intensive in unskilled labor or skilled labor.13 For convenience we
shall refer to a the economy as a \developing economy" if the export good, x, is intensive
in unskilled labor, aux
asx > aum




13An alternative approach would be to consider the two country Heckscher-Ohlin model, where each
country has di®erent endowment ratios, and examine the implications of trade liberalization for each
country. We think however the small country case is simpler and more transparent. Arguably it is also
more relevant. Nevertheless we note that in our model the terms-of-trade are given by exogenous world
prices.
6Our departure from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework lies in labor usage. Not all
labor units are engaged in productive activities. With imperfect law enforcement individ-
uals face an e®ective choice between employing labor in producing goods or services and
expropriating income from other agents. Suppose individual i uses Ni
u units of unskilled
labor and Ni
s units of skilled labor in expropriation. Accordingly, Li
u ´ ¹ Li
u ¡ Ni
u units
of unskilled labor and Li
s ´ ¹ Li
s ¡ Ni
s units of skilled labor are employed in productive
activities. Then, absent expropriation, income from productive activities for i is
!i ´ wuLi
u + ws Li
s.
A fraction ° 2 (0;1) of this income is subject to potential expropriation and hence the
actual income from productive activities may be less than !i. Nevertheless !i may also
be realized if the act of expropriation is veri¯ed by a court. In this case the expropriated
amount is returned back to the owner. Though such rights (i.e., rights to consumption
of one's own income in this case) are provided by law, detection and veri¯cation are
imperfect and costly.
Let z denote the level of legal services in the economy, which is competitively produced
under constant returns to scale using skilled and unskilled labor. This implies
pz = cz(wu;ws); (5)
where cz(wu;ws) and pz respectively denote the unit cost function and the price of z.
Unlike x and m, z is assumed to be non-traded. Naturally, the higher the level of z, the
higher the probability that the claim of expropriation is successfully veri¯ed in the court.
Let ®(z) denote that probability, where ®(:) satis¯es the following properties:
Assumption 1: (i) ®(0) = 0, (ii) ®0(z) > 0, ®00(z) < 0 for all z < ¹ z, (iii) ®(z) < 1 for
all ¯nite z, and (iv) ln(1 ¡ ®(z)) is strictly concave in z.
Assumptions 1(i) and 1(ii) are standard. Assumption 1(iii) says that there is always
7a strictly positive probability that veri¯cation of expropriation claims is unsuccessful.
To understand Assumption 1(iv), note that, for a given z, the probability of failure to
verify/detect expropriation is 1 ¡ ®(z). Conditional on failure, the probability that an
additional unit of z will be successful in detection/veri¯cation is
®0(z)
1¡®(z). The log-concavity
of 1 ¡ ®(z) implies that the conditional probability is increasing in z. That is,
®0(z)
1¡®(z)
increases as z increases.14
3.1 Expropriation Technology
We assume that, in their attempt to expropriate income, each individual can target only
one individual and similarly she can be targeted only by one individual.15 Without loss
of generality, assume that individual i attempts to extract income from k and individual
j attempts to do the same from individual i.
The probability of successfully expropriating another individual's market income depends
on the resources committed to expropriation. The production function for expropriation
is given by e(Ni
u;Ni
s) ´ ei, where








2 < 0; f 2 fu;sg.
The unit cost function associated with this expropriation technology, which captures the
minimum income that an agent i has to forego to produce ei = 1, is given by
c
i












e (wu;ws)=@wu and ai
se ´ @ci




1¡®(z) is often referred to as the hazard rate. In the contract literature, the hazard rate is
usually assumed to be monotone in the underlying variable. See for example, Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005).
15The overlaps - that the same person is are targeted by the same individual - are ruled out by as-
sumption. Allowing for overlaps simply reduce the e®ectiveness of expropriation which has no important
consequence in our model.
8and skilled labor required to produce one unit of ei. The level of ei determines the
probability of i's success in expropriation. More speci¯cally, an agent i succeeds in
expropriation with probability Á(ei) where Á(:) satis¯es the following properties:
Assumption 3: (i) Á(0) = 0, (ii) Á0(ei) > 0;Á00(ei) < 0, and (iii) Á(ei(¹ Lu; ¹ Ls)) < 1.
Assumptions 3(i) and 3(ii) are standard. Assumption 3(iii) says that there is strictly
positive probability of failure even if all resources are devoted to expropriation.
3.2 Income
An individual i's income comes from two sources: productive activities and expropriation.
Consider ¯rst the income from expropriation. If i succeeds in targeting k and is not
detected/convicted by legal authorities then she earns °!k = °(wuLk
u + wsLk
s).16 The
probabilities of (a) i's success in targeting k and (b) failure of detection/veri¯cation by
courts are given by Á(ei) and 1 ¡ ®(z) respectively. Since these two events, given by (a)
and (b), are independent the probability that i successfully expropriates °!k from k is
Á(ei)(1 ¡ ®(z)). In all other cases i's income from expropriation is zero. To summarize,
an individual i's income from expropriation is
°!
k; with probability Á(e
i)(1 ¡ ®(z));
0; with probability 1 ¡ Á(e
i)(1 ¡ ®(z)):
Now consider i's income from productive activities. Given that a fraction °!i can be
successfully expropriated by j with probability Á(ej)(1¡®(z)), i's income from productive
16Alternatively, one could assume that expected income from from targeting a random agent is equal
to the average income per capita ° wu(¹ Le
u ¡ Ne
u) + ws(¹ Le
s ¡ Ne




s are the average
levels of labor and expropriation. Under symmetry this just reduces to the income of the representative
agent °(wuLu + wsLs).
9activities is
(1 ¡ °)!
i; with probability Á(e
j)(1 ¡ ®(z));
!
i; with probability 1 ¡ Á(e
j)(1 ¡ ®(z)):
Taking these di®erent types of incomes and probabilities into account, individual i's
expected overall income turns out to be
!i(1 ¡ °Á(ej)(1 ¡ ®(z))) + °!kÁ(ei)(1 ¡ ®(z)),
part of which is used to meet the cost of legal provision. Assuming that the legal ex-
penditures, pzz, are funded by a uniform per-head tax, individual i's expected income





j)(1 ¡ ®(z))) + °!
kÁ(e
i)(1 ¡ ®(z)) ¡ pzz: (7)
3.3 Utility maximization
Recall from (1) that indirect utility is linear in income. Then, the expected indirect
utility for given levels of appropriation and demand for legal services is




d is given by (7).
To analyze the direct e®ect of a change in trade costs on expropriation activities, we
treat z as exogenous until section 4. For given z and p (which in turn ¯xes wu and ws),
each individual i chooses ei to maximize (8) taking ej as given for all j 6= i.
10Noting that
!
i = wu( ¹ Li
u ¡ N
i




= wu ¹ Li






= wu ¹ Li





the ¯rst order condition of the maximization problem (i.e.,
@ ¹ Vi
@ei = 0) gives
c
i
e(wu;ws) [1 ¡ °Á(e
j) (1 ¡ ®(z))] = Á
0(e
i) (1 ¡ ®(z)) °!
k: (9)
The left-hand side of (9) captures the expected income foregone from devoting labor to
produce an additional unit of expropriation. The right-hand side of (9) captures the
incremental bene¯ts, that is, the expected income from an additional unit of expropri-
ation. In equilibrium these two must be equal. In what follows we focus on symmetric
equilibrium where ei = e, !i = ! for all i. Exploiting symmetry and rearranging (9) we
get:
1 = °(1 ¡ ®(z)) (Á(e) + Á
0(e)(r ¡ e)) (10)
where
r ´




is the ratio of maximum potential income to the opportunity unit cost of expropriation.
Thus, r can be interpreted as the maximum level of expropriation. For the remainder of
the analysis we assume that r ¡ e =
ws¹ Ls+wu¹ Lu¡(wsNs+wuNu)
wsase+wuaue > 0 which holds as long as
all labor is not employed in expropriation.
3.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this small open economy for given z and p comprises of (a) a pair of
factor prices fwu;wsg, (b) a vector of unit labor allocations faux; asx; aum; asm; aue;aseg,
11(c) a pair of output levels fx;mg, and (d) a scalar e such that:17
² wu and ws satisfy the pricing equations (2) and (3),
² e satis¯es (10),
² factor market clears:
aum m + aux x + auz z + aue e = ¹ Lu;
asm m + asx x + asz z + ase e = ¹ Ls;
² and, trade is balanced.
4 Trade Liberalization and Expropriation
Trade liberalization in our framework is equivalent to a reduction in domestic price of the
importables, p.18 To determine the e®ect of a reduction in p on the level of expropriation,
e, ¯rst we examine the e®ect on factor prices. Applying the standard Stolper-Samuelson
theorem gives the following result.
Lemma 1: For an economy that exports the unskilled labor intensive good a reduction in
p reduces skilled wages and increases unskilled wages. The e®ects on wages are reversed
for an economy that exports the skilled labor intensive good.
Proof: Di®erentiating (2) and (3) and simplifying further gives
µux ^ wu + µsx ^ ws = 0;
µum ^ wu + µsm ^ ws = ^ p;
17We omit consumption values, xc and mc, from the de¯nition of equilibrium since these are already
taken into account in the indirect utility function.
18Similarly, an increase in protection or trade sanctions can be viewed as an increase in the price of
importables faced by the domestic consumers.
12where, for any variable b, ^ b ´ dlnb ´ db
b , and µij =
wiaij
wuauj+wsasj (i 2 fu;sg;j 2 fx;mg)










Multiplying both sides of (4) by wu
ws and subsequently adding 1 to each side and rearrang-
ing gives µsx ¡ µsm < 0 for the developing economy and µsx ¡ µsm > 0 for the developed
economy. Then, since ^ p < 0 we have ^ wu > 0 and ^ ws < 0 for the developing and the
opposite signs ( ^ wu < 0 and ^ ws > 0) for the developed economy. QED
It will also be useful to recall the implication of Lemma 1 in terms of the skill premium,
ws=wu. Thus the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that the skill premium falls in a
developing economy, i.e. one that exports the unskilled labor intensive good, ^ ws¡ ^ wu < 0
if µsx ¡ µsm < 0 and rises in a developed economy, ^ ws ¡ ^ wu < 0 if µsx ¡ µsm < 0.
To evaluate the implications of changes in factor prices on the level of expropriation, e,
we also need to evaluate the e®ect of commodity price changes on r, i.e., the ratio of
maximum income to unit cost of expropriation (see equation 11).
Lemma 2: If expropriation activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor (skilled
labor) such that aue
ase > (<)
¹ Lu
¹ Ls, then the e®ect of trade liberalization on r has the same
sign (opposite sign) as the skill premium ^ ws ¡ ^ wu.
Proof: Note that r ´ wu¹ Lu+ws¹ Ls
ce and ce ´ wuaue+wsase is the opportunity cost per unit
of expropriation. We have that
^ r(´ dlnr) = ( ^ ws ¡ ^ wu)(µue ¡ ¸u) (14)
where ¸u ´ wu¹ Lu
wu¹ Lu+ws¹ Ls denotes the unskilled labor income share in each individual's
potential income and µue ´ wuaue
wuaue+wsase denotes the share of unskilled labor income in
13total income foregone by an individual to produce one unit of expropriation.19 From
these de¯nitions we have aue
ase > (<)
¹ Lu
¹ Ls ) µue ¡ ¸u > (<)0. Thus if aue
ase >
¹ Lu
¹ Ls we have
sgn ^ r = sgn ( ^ ws ¡ ^ wu). If however aue
ase <
¹ Lu
¹ Ls we have sgn ^ r = ¡sgn ( ^ ws ¡ ^ wu) QED.
We are now ready to examine the e®ect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium level
of expropriation activities.
Proposition 1: Consider a small open economy with an imperfect legal system and a
given level of legal service provision. If expropriation activities are relatively intensive in
unskilled labor, such that aue
ase >
¹ Lu
¹ Ls, then the e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation
has the same sign as its e®ect on the skill premium. If expropriation activities are
relatively intensive in skilled labor, however, expropriation has the opposite sign to the
skill premium.






Á00(e) (r ¡ e)
> 0 (15)




dp, it follows that the sign of
the e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation activities, de
dp, depends only on the sign
of dr
dp. As shown in Lemma 2, dr
dp has the same sign as the skill premium if expropriation
activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor, and has the opposite sign to the skill
premium if expropriation activities are relatively intensive in skilled labor. QED
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. Trade liberalization increases the returns to
factor used intensively in the exportable sector. If exports are intensive in unskilled labor
(the developing economy case) trade liberalization increases unskilled wages and reduce
skilled labor wages. If expropriation activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor
a rise in unskilled wages increases the opportunity cost of engaging in expropriation, ce
and reduces the potential for e±cient expropriation, r.
19Since there is a unit measure of identical individuals and we are focusing on symmetric equilibrium,
these shares also represent economy wide shares.
14Thus Proposition 1 shows that the bene¯ts of trade liberalization may well include reduc-
tions in labor intensive crime. Arguably it is natural to think of many illicit activities as
labor intensive. Proposition 1 also says, however, that trade liberalization will increase
crime in developing countries if crime is skill intensive. Thus a developing economy faced
with extensive political corruption may have a di®erent liberalization experience from
one that is faced with problems of street crime or civil con°ict. Likewise a developed
economy faced mainly with problems of low skilled crime may experience increases in
crime as a consequence of falling trade costs or trade liberalization.20
5 Endogenous Legal Services
The level of legal services is exogenously given in the model described above. While this
might be appropriate for a short run analysis, in the long run, presumably, the demand
and supply of these services respond to change to prices and incomes as well. Changes
in the demand and costs a®ects the equilibrium level of legal provision which in turn
a®ects the level of expropriation. Below, Lemma 3 records a comparative statics result
for future reference and later in this section, Propositions 2 and 3 examine the e®ect of
trade liberalization on legal services as well as expropriation.
Lemma 3: For any given pair of factor prices (wu;ws), an exogenous increase in the
level of legal services reduces expropriation.








Á00(e) (r ¡ e)
< 0: (16)
The sign follows from noting that Á00(e) > 0, ®0(z) > 0 and r ¡ e > 0. QED
We consider the following sequence of events. First, the government chooses the level of
20Note also that if the factors were land and labor, it would be very natural to think of crime as
labor intensive. Proposition 1 indicates that a positive terms of trade shock to an agricultural exporting
economy might then lead to an increase in crime as land rents rise relative to wages.





by (7). Then each individual i chooses ei to maximize v(p)¹ yi
d taking ej as given for all
j 6= i.
Consider the choice of ei ¯rst. The ¯rst order condition with respect to ei,
@ ¹ Vi
@ei = 0, is
given by (9). Imposing symmetry (i.e., ei = e), (9) reduces to (10). Then, applying
Implicit Function Theorem we have that
e = e(r;z)
where e(r;z) is the value of e that solves °(1 ¡ ®(z)) (Á(e) + Á0(e)(r ¡ e)) = 1.





ddi ´ v(p)[wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls ¡ ce e(r;z) ¡ pzz]:




S(z) ´ [cee(r;z) + pzz]
where S(z) satis¯es the following assumption.
Assumption 4: S(z) is strictly concave in z (i.e., S00(z) < 0).








which implicitly determines the optimal level of legal services. An increase in the level of
legal services lowers expropriation (Lemma 3) which in turn raises overall income in the
economy. The increase in overall income due to an additional unit of z is ¡ce
@e(r;z)
@z while
the cost is cz(wu;ws) = pz. Equation (17) captures the fact that at optimal z, these two
must be equal.
16Lemma 4: For a developing (developed) economy trade liberalization leads to a reduc-
tion (an increase) in
pz
ce if and only if auz
asz < aue
ase.
Proof: Log di®erentiating ce = wuaue +wsase and pz = wuauz +wsasz and subsequently














Recall that ^ p < 0. For the developing economy µsx ¡µsm < 0 and the result follows from
noting that auz
asz < aue
ase ) µuz ¡ µue < 0. For the developed economy µsx ¡ µsm > 0 and
this reverses the sign of (20) QED.
How does trade liberalization a®ect the level of legal services? To answer this consider
equation (17) which implicity determines the optimal level of legal services. If legal
services are relatively skilled-labor intensive compared to expropriation activities, the
right-hand side of (17) decreases with trade liberalization. Loosely speaking, legal services
become cheaper with trade liberalization. If r were una®ected by trade liberalization
then this e®ect alone would lead to higher level of legal services in a developing economy.
However, except for the special case where aue
ase =
¹ Lu
¹ Ls, trade liberalization a®ects r. The
left-hand side of (17),
@e(r;z)
@z , can increase or decrease with r (see below) which in turn
suggests that level of legal services might increase or decrease with trade liberalization.
Thus, despite the fact that Lemma 4 unambiguously signs the e®ect of trade liberalization
on the right hand side of (17), the e®ect of trade on legal service provision is ambiguous.
Moreover since the amount of expropriation depends on the level of legal services it is
natural to expect that the e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation, with endogenous
17legal services, will also be ambiguous. Surprisingly, we ¯nd that this is not the case.
Proposition 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then if expropriation is intensive in




aszg, the e®ect of trade liberalization on expro-
priation has the same sign as the skill premium. If expropriation is intensive in skilled




aszg, then the e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation
has the opposite sign to the skill premium. In both cases the e®ect of trade liberalization
on the level of legal services is ambiguous.





































dp . Furthermore S00(z) < 0 )
@2e(r;z)







@r(Á00(:) ¡ Á000(:)(r ¡ e))
(Á00(e)(r ¡ e))2 ; (22)
is ambiguous since Á000(:) could be positive or negative. This in turn implies that the sign
of dz
dp is ambiguous as well.















Substituting the expression for dz






























@r@z . The e®ect of trade liberalization on expropriation
is given by the sign of the right-hand side of (24). Note, we have already shown that
@2e(r;z)
@z2 > 0. Moreover from Lemma 3 we have ¡
@e(r;z)
@z > 0. The sign of the term £
depends on the extent to which the probability of success in court ®(z) increases as z
increases. In Appendix we prove that log-concavity of 1¡®(z) implies that £ > 0. Given





dp. Again by Lemma 2
and Lemma 4 we know that these terms are both positive for developing economy and
both negative for a developed economy if and only if aue
ase >
¹ Lu
¹ Ls and aue
ase > auz
asz. Together





dp > (<) 0 for a developing (developed)





dp < (>) 0 for a developing
(developed) economy. QED
Thus, even when the e®ect of trade on legal services is ambiguous, expropriation unam-
biguously declines. Intuitively the ambiguity of the change in legal services arises because
because of shifts in the government demand for these services. From (17), ¡ce
@e(r;z)
@z is
the social value of the marginal product of z which may be interpreted as the demand
schedule. The supply schedule is perfectly elastic at price pz = cz. A fall in pz leads to a
shift along this demand curve. However a simultaneous fall in r also shifts the demand
curve toward the origin leaving the sign of z ambiguous.
As shown by Proposition 2 however, this ambiguity is irrelevant for determining the
e®ect of trade liberalization of expropriation. In fact Proposition 2 shows that with
endogenous law enforcement the results of Proposition 1 are maintained with just one
additional condition, given by Lemma 4. The additional condition, moreover, does not
necessarily imply any restriction on the range of factor intensities rankings over which
the results hold.
Thus the model points to some potential consequences of rising skill premiums associated
with trade liberalization and falling trade costs. It suggests that falling trade costs will
increase crime in countries with skilled labour intensive exports, such as the U.S.A., if
crime is intensive unskilled labor. Empirically this suggests globalization might increase
19crime in the U.S.A.. Though crime rates have been falling in the U.S.A., Imrohoroglu,
Merlo and Rupert (2004) ¯nd that crime rates would have fallen faster had it not been
for rising inequality. Moreover some of this increase in inequality can be attributed
to international factors.21 Perhaps more importantly however the model suggests that
the positive e®ect of trade on unskilled wages may help reduce both the incentives for
expropriation and the costs of legal services in economies that export labor intensive
goods.
5.1 Log-concavity of 1 ¡ ®(z)
The ¯nding, in Proposition 2, that trade liberalization lowers expropriation relies on
the assumption that 1 ¡ ®(z) is log-concave. The assumption eliminates the possibility
that increments in spending on z reduce the conditional probability of conviction. This
assumption, which is weaker than standard assumption of concavity, is quite plausible
and used extensively in the contract literature. Without log-concavity we can obtain the
same result, that is, trade liberalization lowers expropriation if the ratio of aggregate





So far we have assumed that the legal services which detect and verify expropriation
claims are publicly provided. What happens if, instead, we assume that each individual
i has to purchase zi units of legal services privately once their income is expropriated?
Except for the nature of the provision of the legal services itself (private versus public)
there are two di®erences. First, an individual i does not purchase and hence does not
21According to Rodrik (1997), trade accounts for a small but signi¯cant fraction (10-20 percent) of
the observed rising inequality in the U.S.A. and Pablo, Lederman and Loayza (2002) and Soares (2004)
show that inequality is positively related to crime. In a similar vein Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2006)
¯nd a signi¯cant correlation between immigration, which also increases the skill premium, black wages,
black employment rates, and black incarceration rates in the U.S.A..
22Details are available upon request.
20pay for the legal services unless she is targeted successfully by individual j. Second, is
the timing of decisions. In case of private provision, each individual choosing ei and zi
simultaneously to maximize (8) taking (ej;zj) as given for all j 6= i, seems more natural
than the two stage game in section 4, where z is chosen prior to ei. Incorporating these
di®erences in the model, we ¯nd that, as in the private provision case, trade liberalization
lowers expropriation if expropriation activities are relatively intensive in unskilled labor.
See Appendix B for details.
Note that, in some of the poorest regions in the world (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) there
is an acute lack of social capital so that there is neither government provision nor a
private market for legal services. In such situations, according to Collier and Gunning
(1999), communities have turned to traditional types of social organization. Modifying
our framework suitably, our analysis can be applied for those situations as well. Sub-
stituting pz by cz(wu;ws) and interpreting z as self-provided defense services the entire
analysis in Appendix B goes through. Thus presence of a competitive market is not
crucial and we can also interpret the private provision case as a model where security
services are produced by the household.
6 Gains from Trade
Compared to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework ours has two new activities: ex-
propriation and legal services. Reallocation of resources between these activities and the
tradables sector can generate additional gains or losses beyond the standard gains. The
precise magnitude, in general, depends on factor intensity rankings as well as the size
of legal sector and extent of expropriation. However to determine that there are indeed
additional gains and not additional losses (and vice versa), we ¯nd that under certain
circumstances, the factor-intensity ranking of sectors alone is su±cient.






ddi ´ v(p)[wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls ¡ (wuaue + wsase)e(r;z) ¡ pzz] (25)
where z solves (17). To capture the additional gains from trade, ¯rst we need to consider a
standard Heckscher-Ohlin economy with no expropriation or legal services. Set e = z = 0




















´cee(r;z)(µue ¡ ¸u) + pzz(¸u ¡ µuz)
(µsm ¡ µsx)[wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls ¡ (wuaue + wsase)e(r;z) ¡ pzz]
:
(27)





Á0(e) ) ¡ 1.23
The underlying product and factor prices are same in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
economy and the economy with expropriation and legal services. This in turn implies
that the factor shares in the unit cost functions of the tradable goods (i.e., µij, where
i = u;s and j = x;m) are same in the two economies as well. Then, comparing (26) and
(27), it follows that the magnitude of additional gains from trade is
´cee(r;z)(µue ¡ ¸u) + pzz(¸u ¡ µuz)
(µsm ¡ µsx)[wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls ¡ (wuaue + wsase)e(r;z) ¡ pzz]
; (28)
which we denote by ¢ hereafter. Recall from De¯nition 1 that µsm ¡ µsx > 0 for a
developing economy and µsm ¡ µsx < 0 for a developed economy. Hence for a developing
economy the denominator of (28) is strictly positive for any economy with strictly positive
consumption of x or m and strictly negative for the developed economy. To sign (28) it
remains only to sign the numerator. Note that, if aue
ase =
¹ Lu
¹ Ls = auz
asz then µue = ¸u = µuz,
and there are no additional gains or losses (i.e., ¢ = 0). The economy with expropriation
23See Appendix A for the derivation of (27).
22and legal services in this case is e®ectively a scaled-down version of the standard small
open Heckscher-Ohlin economy where the scale is invariant to the factor prices.
Proposition 3: Suppose that ´ > 0. If auz
asz <
¹ Lu
¹ Ls < aue
ase then, in presence of expropriation
and legal services, there are additional gains from trade liberalization for the developing




¹ Ls > aue
ase, then there are additional losses from trade liberalization for the
developing economy and additional gains for the developed economy.
Proof: Note that auz
asz <
¹ Lu
¹ Ls < aue
ase , wuauz
wuauz+wsasz < wu¹ Lu
wu¹ Lu+ws¹ Ls < wuaue
wuaue+wsase , µuz <
¸u < µue. Then, from (28) it immediately follows that ¢ > 0 for the developing economy





ase , µuz > ¸u > µue which in turn implies that ¢ < (>)0 for a developing (developed)
economy. QED
Proposition 4 implies that if
¹ Lu





alone can determine whether there are additional gains or losses from trade liberalization.
In other cases size of the legal sector and scale of expropriation activities are necessary
to sign ¢.
How restrictive is the requirement that ´ > 0? We ¯nd that a su±cient condition for
´ > 0 to hold is that eÁ00(e) + Á0(e) > 0. Under the standard speci¯cation Á(e) = ke¾
where k > 0;¾ < 1, this condition is satis¯ed for all e > 0. Also in general this condition
is satis¯ed if e is less than a certain threshold.24
It is worth noting that, even if trade liberalization lowers expropriation, this does not
necessarily imply there are additional gains. A reduction in expropriation releases re-
sources for production of tradables which creates additional gains. These gains, however,
could be more than o®set if the legal sector expands as well with trade liberalization and
24Note, except for the fact that it is bounded above by unity, the properties of Á(e) are similar to
the ones of an utility function. Interpreting Á(e) as the utility function in e and Á0(e) as the price, the
condition eÁ00(e) + Á0(e) > 0 means that the marginal revenue is positive. For an arbitrary demand
function marginal revenue is not positive for all output levels. However the output levels where marginal
revenue is negative are not interesting as they never arise in a pro¯t-maximizing equilibrium as long as
marginal cost is positive.
23absorbs more than the resources released in the economy because of lower expropriation.




¹ Ls, expropriation declines with trade liberalization (Proposi-
tion 2). However this ordering does not necessarily generate additional gains from trade
(see Proposition 4). In fact if pzz is large, ¢ < 0.
7 Conclusion
We have considered a Heckscher-Ohlin type model of a small open economy in which
there is an imperfect level of protection of property rights. This imperfection means that
a positive level of expropriation will exist in equilibrium. We use the model to determine
under what conditions trade liberalization, or falling trade costs, will increase or decrease
expropriation through changing the incentives to engage in expropriation and changing
the costs of legal services. The overall impact is shown to depend upon a chain of factor
intensity rankings. Depending on these rankings we show that the gains from trade may
be ampli¯ed or muted due to changing levels of expropriation.
The results show therefore that trade liberalization will have a di®erent impact on expro-
priation in di®erent countries, depending on their trade patterns. Assuming, for example,
that crime is essentially a labour intensive activity, the results show that trade liberal-
ization can increase crime in an economy with skilled labor intensive exports, such as
the U.S.A.. Since crime levels tend to be most severe in developing countries, however,
an important result from the model is the possibility that trade liberalization can reduce
expropriation and amplify the gains from trade. This is shown to be more likely to oc-
cur in countries that export labour intensive goods, as is the case in many developing
economies.
24Appendix A: Proofs
First, we prove a claim used in the proof of Proposition 2. Then we provide the details
of the derivation of (27).













where f(r;e(r;z)) ´ 1
Á00(e(r;z))(r¡e(r;z)) and h(z) ´
®0(z)
(1¡®(z))2. Di®erentiating (A.1)with







































Since h(:) > 0;
@e(r;z)
@z < 0, and
@f(:)
@r = ¡ 1





Also, we have f(:) > 0 and
@e(r;z)














Di®erentiating h(z) with respect to z gives
h
0(z) = ¡









25We have that (i)
dln(1¡®(z))
dz < 0, and (ii)
d2 ln(1¡®(z))
dz2 ¸ 0(since 1 ¡ ®(z) is log-concave).
Together (i) and (ii) imply h0(z) > 0.





d(wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls) ¡ dS(z)
wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls ¡ cee(r;z) ¡ pzz
(A.3)
where S(z) ´ cee(r;z) + pzz and z solves (17).
We have that d(wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls) = (wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls)(¸u ^ wu + (1 ¡ ¸u) ^ ws). Substituting
^ wu = µsx
µsx¡µsm ^ p and ^ ws = ¡ µux
µsx¡µsm ^ p from (12) and (13) respectively we get




Totally di®erentiating S(:) gives dS(:) = (ce
@e(r;z)
@z + pz)dz + ce
@e
@rdr + e(r;z))dce + zdpz.
By (17), ce
@e(r;z)






^ r + cee(r;z)^ ce + pzz^ pz:
Substituting the expressions for @e
@r, ^ r, ^ ce and ^ pz from (15), (14), (18) and (19) respectively
in the right-hand side of the equation above and rearanging we get:




´cee(r;z)(µue ¡ ¸u) + pzz(¸u ¡ µuz)
µsm ¡ µsx
^ p





Á0(e) ) ¡ 1. Substituting the expressions for d(wu ¹ Lu + ws ¹ Ls) and dS(:)
in (A.3) and rearranging gives (27).
26Appendix B: Private Provision of Legal Services
As discussed in section 6.1 the basic model is the same as in section 2 except for the
timing of decisions and payment for legal services. The level of e and z are chosen
simultaneously in the private provision case, where as in the public provision case each
individual chooses ei after the government has determined the level of z. Also, in the
private provision case, since each individual purchases legal services only when she is
targeted there is strictly positive probability that an individual does not pay for the legal
services. In the public provision case however, each individual, irrespective of the fact
whether she is targeted or not, pays for legal services since legal expenditures are met
through per-head tax.
Consider the optimization problem faced by an individual i who targets individual k and





























The expressions in the left-hand sides of (B.1) and (B.2) capture the incremental expected
bene¯t from an additional unit of ei and zi respectively while the right-hand sides express
the expected marginal costs. In symmetric equilibrium with ei = e;zi = z and !i = ! for
27all i 2 [0;1], equations (B.1) and (B.2), after some rearrangement reduce to the following:
°(1 ¡ ®(z)) (Á(e) + Á
































Á(e)+Á0(e)(r¡e)( ^ wu¡ ^ ws)
(¸u¡µuz+ e




From Lemma 1 we know that ^ wu ¡ ^ ws > 0. The term e
r¡e is positive. Applying As-
sumptions 1-3 we can show that all other entries in 2 £ 2 matrix are strictly positive.
Nonetheless, the signs of ^ e and ^ z are ambiguous, and in general will depend on the sectoral
factor intensities and the extent of expropriation activities. The proposition below tells
us that ^ e and ^ z can be signed unambiguously when expropriation activities are unskilled




¹ Ls < aue
ase and e
r¡e is small. Then, for a developing economy
trade liberalization increases the level of legal services sector and reduces the extent of
expropriation. For a developed economy trade liberalization reduces the level of legal




¹ Ls > aue
ase.
Proof: Applying Cramer's Rule and letting e ! 0 we get
^ e =




( ^ wu ¡ ^ ws) < 0;
^ z =
(¸u ¡ µuz)( ^ wu ¡ ^ ws)
²®
> 0;
where ²® ´ ¡
z®00(z)
®0(z) , ²e ´ ¡
eÁ00(e)
Á0(e) . Applying assumptions 1(ii) and 3(ii) respectively we
have that ²® > 0 and ²e > 0. Then, the inequalities in the equations above (determining
28the sign of ^ e and ^ z) follow from noting that (i) auz
asz <
¹ Lu
¹ Ls < aue
ase ) µuz < ¸u < µue, and




¹ Ls > aue
ase we have µuz > ¸u > µue and the signs of ^ e and ^ z are reversed.
QED
Note further that in order to determine change in e the condition
¹ Lu
¹ Ls < (>)aue
ase is su±cient,
but not necessary. For example consider the case of a developing economy. Even if
expropriation is skilled labor intensive such that
¹ Lu
¹ Ls > aue
ase (and accordingly ¸u > µue),
expropriation can decline with trade liberalization if the level of legal services increase.
To see this, suppose that ¸u ¡ µue > 0 but small. Assume that e is small as well. Then
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